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I. Introduction 
 This paper examines the effectiveness of section 271 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the 
Act) in achieving Congress’ goals of increasing competition in the local and long distance telephone 
markets.  In section 271, Congress developed an incentive structure whereby incumbent Bell Operating 
Companies (BOCs) are rewarded with entry into long distance markets in their territory if they can 
demonstrate to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) that they have opened their local 
wireline markets to competition.  In this paper we examine the logic behind this structure, to determine if 
it is a reasonable means of achieving increased competition in both the local and long distance markets.2  
We also provide an update on the extent of competitive entry in the local exchange market five years after 
enactment of the Act.  
 Some commentators have claimed that the section 271 process is unnecessary, alleging that it is a 
superfluous regulatory scheme that unnecessarily duplicates the market-opening provisions of section 251 
(e.g., Hausman and Sidak 1999, 430).  There has also been extensive debate about the consequences of 
delayed BOC entry into the long distance market, with some economists arguing that immediate entry 
would provide the greatest benefit to consumers (e.g., Crandall and Hazlett 2000, Crandall 1999).  After 
analyzing the industry’s technical and economic structure, and the legal and informational constraints 
under which regulators operate, we conclude that section 271 is a reasonably effective incentive 
mechanism for opening the local exchange market to competition, and is superior to other regulatory 
alternatives that are available.  We also agree with those who argue that the use of entry into the long 
distance market as a prize for the BOCs will benefit the long distance market by adding an additional 
competitor only when that competitor’s ability to vertically leverage its market power has been 
significantly reduced.  Delaying entry until the local market is open to competition provides an 
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appropriate safeguard against potential BOC discrimination against competitors in the long distance 
market (Schwartz 2000). 
In section II we summarize the structure of sections 271 and 251 of the Act, and review the 
interrelation of section 271 and the market-opening provisions of section 251, in light of the history of the 
line-of-service restriction imposed by the Modification of Final Judgement.  In section III we examine the 
economic, institutional and legal environment in which regulators operate, and discuss whether section 
271 is likely to be an effective means of opening local telecommunications markets to competition, and 
whether BOC entry into the long distance market should be linked to local market access obligations.  
Section IV provides a statistical assessment of the development of local competition across the country, 
using available data, while section V offers some concluding remarks. 
II. Development of Section 271 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
A. The Local Exchange Market Prior to the Act 
For over half a century AT&T’s telecommunications network, which included both local and 
long-distance services, effectively was treated as a natural monopoly.  In 1974 the Department of Justice  
initiated a lawsuit against AT&T under the Sherman Antitrust Act, alleging that AT&T used its local 
exchange monopoly to prevent competitive entry into the long distance and equipment manufacturing 
markets.  The trial ended in a 1982 settlement known as the Modification of Final Judgment (MFJ).  
Under a key feature of the MFJ, AT&T divested itself of its local exchange telephone companies in 1984.  
These local exchange companies were organized into seven regional BOCs.  The BOCs were subject to 
line-of-service restrictions that, among other things, prohibited them from competing in the long distance 
market.  
The rationale underlying the divestiture was that AT&T would be unable to exercise monopoly 
control over the long distance market once it had lost control of the local exchange market.  Moreover, 
without the line-of-service restriction prohibiting BOC entry into the long distance market, the BOCs 
would have the incentive to misallocate costs and subsidize competitive long distance services with their 
monopolized local exchange services, and degrade the quality of access received by interexchange 
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carriers (552 F.Supp 131, 162, 165, 170-75). 
Under section VIII(C) of the MFJ, a BOC could petition for relief from the line-of-service 
restriction prohibiting BOC entry into the long distance market, if it could successfully demonstrate to the 
court “that there is no substantial possibility that it could use its monopoly power to impede competition 
in the market it seeks to enter.”  No BOC, however, successfully petitioned under the MFJ to provide long 
distance services.3  
B. The Interrelationship of Sections 251 & 271 of the Act 
 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 fundamentally altered the regulation of local 
telecommunications markets in the United States.  It replaced the MFJ’s restrictions on the BOCs with a 
new set of regulations,4 and provided a means for the BOCs to enter the long-distance market.  In the Act 
Congress also directed the FCC to remove the barriers that historically protected incumbent BOC local 
exchange carrier monopolies from competition and to develop regulatory policies that promote 
competition in local exchange markets.  Two key elements of the Act supply the framework for opening 
up the BOCs’ networks to competitors: section 251 and section 271.  Both are briefly reviewed below.   
1. Section 251 
 Section 251 imposed a new set of requirements on local exchange companies (LECs), including 
the duty to provide for number portability, dialing parity, reciprocal compensation, resale of all services 
provided, and access to rights of way it owns (47 U.S.C. sect. 251(b)).  LECs classified as incumbent 
local exchange carriers (ILECs), which are firms that have traditionally provided local exchange service 
in a local area and presumably have substantial market power in their local exchange market (47 U.S.C. 
sect. 251(h)), have an additional set of obligations to open up their networks for use by competitors.  
Under section 251, ILECs are required to provide resold services to competitive local exchange 
carriers (CLECs) (47 U.S.C. sect. 251(c)).  Thus, a CLEC can purchase the same services an ILEC makes 
available to its end-user customers at a discount that reflects the retail price minus avoided costs.  
In addition, section 251 requires ILECs to provide access to the piece parts of their networks as 
separate, unbundled network elements (UNEs).  In effect, this allows a CLEC to lease only those portions 
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of the ILEC’s network it wishes to use as inputs in providing its own telecommunications services to its 
own end-user customers.  At present the FCC requires ILECs to provide UNE access to 7 UNEs, 
including loops (the transmission facilities between the demarcation point at the end-user’s premises and 
the ILEC’s central office), local circuit switching (equipment that determines the routing of local calls), 
and dedicated and shared transport (interoffice transmission facilities) (47 C.F.R. sect. 319).5  These 
UNEs must be offered at cost-based prices, based on the pricing standards in section 252 of the Act, 
which the FCC has implemented as the marginal cost of offering the element in a hypothetical, 
technologically efficient network under the TELRIC (Total Element Long-Run Incremental Cost) 
standard.6  CLECs may order these elements on an individual basis or as part of a complete package 
known as the UNE platform (UNE-P).  In addition, an ILEC is required to permit interconnection at any 
technically feasible point, and provide for the collocation of equipment necessary for a competitor’s 
interconnection or access to UNEs. 
Finally, ILECs are required to negotiate in good faith interconnection agreements with 
competitors wishing to arrange interconnection and collocation, and purchase the ILECs’ services through 
resale and purchase of UNEs.  The process and deadlines for negotiating agreements, and for state 
arbitration of open issues, are laid out in section 252.  State public utility commissions (PUCs) are given 
substantial responsibility for applying sections 251, 252, and the FCC’s rules implementing those 
sections, to arrangements and interconnection agreements in their states. 
 Thus section 251 effectively provides for three modes of entry for CLECs: full facilities-based, 
partially facilities-based, and resale of the ILEC’s services.  Full facilities-based entry, in which the 
CLEC provides its own facilities and only needs interconnection and rights of way from the ILEC, has the 
potential to provide significant benefits to consumers, because CLECs are incented to develop new 
services, and bring new technologies to market, in order to differentiate their product offerings from the 
ILEC.  Yet, scale economies outside of populated, downtown areas rich with business customers are 
unlikely to justify the cost of deploying new network facilities.  The ability to enter using partial facilities-
based entry allows for efficient choices regarding network duplication.  Thus, CLECs may be able to rely 
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on those UNEs, such as the local loop, where the economies of scale and scope are large and make entry 
difficult, and combine them with their own complementary facilities where deployment costs are justified 
by potential revenues, such as switching (an entry strategy known as UNE-Loop or UNE-L).  This allows 
them the limited ability to provide their own set of unique services, without incurring the significant costs 
of duplicating bottleneck facilities.7  Finally, entry through resale of the ILEC’s services (which includes 
UNE-P) requires that the CLEC provide no transmission facilities of its own, allowing CLECs to reach 
customers for whom the cost of building facilities to serve them is too high to be practical, but limits them 
to providing the same services that are offered by the ILEC, over the same facilities.8  
2. Section 271 
 If in section 251 Congress supplied the basic principles for local competition, by describing the 
terms and conditions for interconnection, resale, and access to unbundled network elements, then in 
section 271, Congress supplied the structured incentive for the largest ILECs, the BOCs, to abide by these 
principles and demonstrate their compliance. 
 Under section 271, a BOC must meet four requirements in order to receive authority from the 
FCC to provide in-region long distance services.  Under the first of these four requirements, known as the 
Track A/Track B test, a BOC must show that either a facilities-based competitor currently exists within its 
market (Track A) or that the BOC has offered to provide competitors with access and interconnection to 
its network but no alternative provider has chosen to accept the offer (Track B).9   
Under the second requirement, a BOC must demonstrate compliance with a 14-point competitive 
checklist.  This checklist features a list of 14 discrete access requirements that reflect the basic 
interconnection principles of section 251.  Among other items, the checklist requires that a BOC 
demonstrate that it provides interconnection, nondiscriminatory access to the UNEs required under 
section 251 at cost-based prices, local dialing parity, and the poles, ducts, conduits, and rights of way 
owned by the BOC.  The checklist also requires that a BOC demonstrate that it makes its own retail 
services available for resale.  
Under section 271’s third requirement, a BOC must demonstrate how it will comply with section 
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272 of the Act, which requires that any BOC long distance services be provided through a separate 
affiliate, with separate books, officers and employees, and with all transactions between the BOC and the 
affiliate conducted at arm’s length.  These structural safeguards amount to a congressional 
acknowledgement that following section 271 approval, a BOC may still have an incentive to discriminate 
in providing exchange access services and facilities that rival interexchange carriers (IXCs) need to 
compete (FCC 1996b, 21911-13).  Finally, the fourth requirement under section 271 requires that the 
FCC determine that a BOC’s entry into the long distance market in a particular state is in the public 
interest (47 U.S.C. sect. 271(d)(3)(C)).  
 The FCC is required to make its determination on an application within 90 days of filing.  Section 
271 also specifically requires that the FCC consult with the Department of Justice and the state 
commission, and give “substantial weight” to the Department of Justice’s evaluation of the BOC’s filing. 
 As of this writing, the BOCs have filed a total of 20 section 271 applications with the FCC.  
During the first three years following enactment, the FCC denied 5 applications and 1 applicant chose to 
withdraw its filing.  In 1999, the FCC approved its first section 271 application, for Bell Atlantic New 
York.  Since that time, the FCC has approved 7 applications and 3 applicants have chosen to withdraw 
their filings.  In addition, as of this writing, 4 applications are pending at the FCC.  Table 1 provides a 
brief overview of the BOC applications filed since enactment of the Act.  
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Table 1: Resolution of Past Section 271 Applications 
Applicant State Filing Date Resolution Date Resolution  
Ameritech Michigan I 1/2/97 2/11/97 Withdrawn   
SBC Oklahoma I 4/11/97 6/27/97 Denied  
Ameritech Michigan II 5/21/97 8/19/97 Denied   
BellSouth South Carolina 9/30/97 12/24/97 Denied   
BellSouth Louisiana I 11/6/97 2/4/98 Denied   
BellSouth Louisiana II 7/9/98 10/13/98 Denied   
Bell Atlantic New York 9/29/99 12/22/99 Approved   
SBC Texas I 1/10/00 4/5/00 Withdrawn   
SBC Texas II 4/5/00 6/30/00 Approved   
Verizon Massachusetts I 9/22/00 12/18/00 Withdrawn  
SBC Kansas 10/26/00 1/22/01 Approved 
SBC Oklahoma II 10/26/00 1/22/01 Approved   
Verizon Massachusetts II 1/16/01 4/16/01 Approved  
SBC Missouri I 4/4/01 6/7/01 Withdrawn   
Verizon Connecticut 4/23/01 7/20/01 Approved   
Verizon Pennsylvania 6/21/01 9/19/01 Approved   
SBC Missouri II 6/21/01 11/18/01 (Deadline) Pending 
SBC Arkansas 8/20/01 11/18/01 (Deadline) Pending  
BellSouth Georgia 10/2/01 12/31/01 (Deadline) Pending  
BellSouth Louisiana III 10/2/01 12/31/01 (Deadline) Pending  
 
III. Section 271 as an Appropriate Market-Opening Mechanism and Safeguard Against 
Discrimination 
To determine whether the incentive structure of section 271 is an appropriate mechanism for 
increasing the competitiveness of local telecommunications markets, we examine two issues in this 
section of the paper: (1) whether section 271 is the best means of achieving the market-opening goals of 
section 251, given the informational and legal constraints regulators labor under; and (2) whether it is 
rational to link BOC entry into the long distance market to BOC success in opening the local market to 
competition.  
A. Increasing Competition in the Local Market:  Is Section 271 the Best Method of 
Achieving the Goals of Section 251? 
1. Background – The Challenge Facing Policymakers 
This paper does not concern itself with the question of whether the goals of section 251 are 
economically desirable.  Given the ILECs’ enormous costs of opening up their networks to competition, 
the significant scale economies involved in providing local telecommunications services, and the 
regulatory costs involved in forcing reluctant incumbent providers to open their networks to competitors, 
 8
it is at this point unclear whether the future benefits of increased competition will outweigh the costs of 
implementing section 251. For the sake of this paper, we assume that section 251's goals are achievable 
and economically desirable, and that the long-run expected net benefits to society and to consumers from 
implementing such a scheme is positive.10  The legislator’s/regulator’s problem is to design an incentive 
mechanism to best achieve these goals.  
 There is a substantial theoretical and empirical literature on the design of incentive mechanisms 
for the communications industry (see, e.g., Berg and Foreman 1996; Laffont & Tirole 2000).  These 
mechanisms solve the basic principal-agent problem, in which the regulator is attempting through an 
appropriate monitoring and reward structure to elicit a desired kind of behavior from a regulatee.  Crucial 
factors involved in determining which type of mechanism is most efficient is the information the regulator 
has about the company’s costs and capabilities, the regulator’s ability to monitor the actions of the 
company, and the tools the regulator has available to provide incentives to achieve the right behavior 
(Laffont & Tirole 1993, ch. 1).  As we show later, the nature of the informational asymmetries must be 
carefully considered before deciding which mechanism will be most effective. 
 Two key well-known characteristics of the industry make opening up the local 
telecommunications market to competition difficult.  First, the telecommunications industry is 
characterized by large network effects.  The value of the network depends on the number of subscribers, 
making larger networks more valuable to join.  Thus interconnection with the incumbent LEC is essential 
for new entrants and small carriers to be able to survive and compete.  Second, local telecommunications 
networks have large fixed costs for certain parts of their operations, leading to significant economies of 
scale.11  As a result, there are bottlenecks in the production of local exchange services for many kinds of 
customers.  For instance, it is generally believed that for the majority of subscribers, the scale economies 
involved make duplicating the local loop by CLECs prohibitively expensive under current technologies. 
 Section 251 attempts to enable competition in the local exchange market in the face of these 
network effects and scale economies by requiring all ILECs to interconnect and to provide 
nondiscriminatory access to the piece parts of their networks as separate, unbundled network elements at 
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cost-based prices, as well as provide their services for resale (47 U.S.C. sect. 251(c)).  By providing the 
means for three kinds of entry strategies (resale, full facilities-based, and partial facilities-based), section 
251 increases the likelihood that competition will develop for all customers.12 
Nonetheless, several factors make the implementation of the section 251 scheme difficult for 
regulators, particularly the technical complexity and closed architectures of the ILEC systems, and the 
lack of incentives for ILECs to cooperate.  The technical complexity of the ILECs' internal operations 
means regulators need a large amount of information to properly monitor and evaluate ILEC progress in 
making required changes to their systems.  The informational demands on regulators are further increased 
by the rapid rate of technological change, which forces frequent reassessment of the situation.13 
Meanwhile, many critical aspects of ILEC networks, organizational structures, and back-end 
systems used to provision service are closed architectures.  By closed architectures, we mean systems 
designed to operate efficiently internally, but not designed for outside use or access to the intermediate 
stages of production and consumption.  Many of these architectures were developed prior to the Act, and 
therefore were constructed based on the assumption that services would only be used internally.  
Consequently, to meet the requirements of section 251, ILECs are obligated to resolve a large number of 
technical and organizational problems, including: designing and implementing changes to their systems 
so CLECs can interconnect with their networks and utilize their network elements;14 finding and 
constructing space for CLEC collocation of equipment; developing standardized interfaces and 
organizational procedures for CLECs to use to access their OSS computer systems to place orders and 
trouble tickets; generating technical documentation and building a support staff to support CLECs use of 
ILEC systems; creating new organizational structures to support the ILECs' wholesale operations, for 
example to manually process orders and handle troubles with CLEC lines; and working out new 
contractual and informational arrangements with CLECs.15  Thus, rather than view the Act’s requirements 
as creating a static obligation for the ILECs to allow access to their networks by competitors, a more 
appropriate view might be to think of the Act as initiating a massive engineering project to convert the 
ILEC systems from closed to open architectures.16 
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 Two important consequences follow from the technical complexity and closed architecture of the 
ILECs’ networks.  First, there is substantial uncertainty as to the time, effort and expense needed to 
complete the process of opening up the ILEC systems.  Second, the regulator must possess an enormous 
amount of information to be able to assess whether the ILEC is implementing the processes appropriately. 
Thus it becomes difficult for a regulator, who often lacks technical expertise and first-hand knowledge, to 
determine whether the ILEC is making appropriate progress in making changes to its systems.  
 Usually regulators are able to rely on the regulated firm’s natural incentives to provision a good.17  
ILECs, however, lack the incentive to open up their networks to their competitors.  Not only is opening 
up their networks perceived as an additional and costly burden, but their success undermines the source of 
their market power (Economides 1999).18  The development of a new contractual relationship between 
two firms normally requires significant effort and expense by the two firms to negotiate the terms and 
conditions of the contract, and to solve technical problems that may arise.  Here ILECs potentially lack 
the incentive to negotiate in good faith, and to devote the physical and managerial resources needed to 
resolve the considerable number of problems that can be expected to arise from opening up their closed 
architecture network.  When one side has a vested interest in preventing agreement, negotiations can bog 
down and be delayed indefinitely.19  Regulators, therefore, must monitor the negotiation and 
interconnection process, but lack reliable tools for measuring good faith effort.20  Marius Schwartz points 
out that it is easier for regulators to monitor existing arrangements than the negotiation and development 
of new ones (Schwartz 2000).  The development of an appropriate monitoring and incentive mechanism 
thus becomes essential if regulators want to ensure that the ILECs' network is opened up to competitors in 
a timely manner. 
2. Alternative Schemes 
 Congress had the freedom to choose which method it wanted to use to ensure that the BOCs, who 
were operating under the MFJ, would comply with section 251’s requirements.  When a new requirement 
is imposed on regulated companies, some thought must be given to developing a scheme to ensure 
efficient compliance.  Taking into consideration the market characteristics just discussed, we next review 
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a variety of alternatives to the section 271 incentive structure that might have been used to induce 
compliance with the market-opening provisions of section 251.  
Penalties for Observed Infractions.  One alternative incentive structure involves monitoring 
ILECs’ behavior and imposing penalties for observed infractions.  Kinds of penalties available include 
fines payable to the federal government, liquidated damages paid to affected CLECs, and suspension of 
an ILEC’s participation in the in-region long distance market.  Any fine or penalty used would need to be 
set large enough to deter noncompliance (Ford & Jackson 1999).  This sort of scheme is the most 
common and most direct means of ensuring compliance with new laws and regulations.  It is most 
effective when the requirements for compliance are clear, monitoring compliance is easy, and imposing 
fines or other enforcement penalties can be done directly and quickly. 
For the purpose of implementing section 251, however, this method has significant drawbacks. 
The technical complexity of the network, and the substantial work needed to open up the ILEC’s network 
and negotiate agreements for access and interconnection, makes it very difficult for a regulator to attempt 
to impose detailed requirements concerning what the ILEC must do, continually monitor the efforts made 
by the ILEC to comply, and spot and penalize every small violation.  The regulator operates at a 
significant informational disadvantage, because of his lack of first-hand knowledge, resources, and 
equivalent technical expertise.  The FCC’s implementation of its Open Network Architecture (ONA) 
scheme—which predates the Act but similarly involves ILEC obligations to supply “unbundled” 
telecommunications inputs to third parties—illustrates how difficult it is for the regulator to resolve, as 
one commentator observed, “disputes over the details of what has—and has not—actually been 
implemented” (Schwartz 2000, 270). 
In addition, the regulator has the burden of demonstrating that a fine or other enforcement action 
is warranted.  The imposition of penalties for infractions will only be effective when both the standards 
for section 251 compliance and the evidence of malfeasance are clear.  Because this kind of clarity is rare 
in this context, and is complicated further by political pressures and the threat of legal challenges, it 
would be difficult to initiate frequent, quick, decisive enforcement actions. 
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 Deadlines.  For regulators, outcomes are often easier to observe than the process.  As a result, 
some of the disadvantages of the informational asymmetries facing regulators may be ameliorated if a 
deadline-oriented scheme is used.  A deadline could be set by Congress, or the FCC could be allowed to 
set a deadline and/or grant extensions, with perhaps some penalty for noncompliance. 
 Determining how long a task should take, and setting the appropriate deadline, however, can be 
tricky, particularly if the task is technically complex.  Regulators also may have a difficult time 
determining the merits of a regulated company’s request for extension.  For example, thirty-one carriers 
have asked for a waiver of the FCC’s October 1, 2001 implementation deadline for wireless carriers to 
provide the locations of customers calling 911 (Stern, E1). The FCC has faced similar requests for an 
extension of the September 30, 2000 deadline for carriers to comply with packet-mode communications 
electronic surveillance requirements under the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act 
(FCC 2001b).  Regulators have the additional problem of deciding whether the company’s actions are 
sufficient to be considered to have met the deadline.  The pressure to pass may be considerable if an 
automatic penalty results from a declaration of noncompliance. 
Allow the States to Devise Their Own Schemes.  Alternatively, Congress could have encouraged 
the states to experiment with different regulatory structures in order to identify the market-opening 
schemes that generate the most benefits to consumers.  Yet there are drawbacks to such a scheme.  If each 
state has a different set of interconnection and unbundling rules, the ILECs would bear the significant 
costs of implementing a different scheme in each state.  This scheme would also significantly raise the 
costs for CLECs attempting national or regional entry strategies, since they would have to develop 
different internal OSS systems to support a different scheme in each state, engage in more state specific 
negotiations with the ILEC, and lobby in each state to achieve the desired system.  In addition, many state 
PUCs lack the technical personnel to design and implement an efficient scheme, and some state PUCs are 
more susceptible to lobbying from various parties, particularly the ILEC.  Before passage of the Act only 
a few states had taken steps to open their local markets to competition.21 
Provide Direct Financial Compensation to the ILECs for Unbundling.  Congress and/or the FCC 
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alternatively could have provided a greater direct financial incentive for ILECs to interconnect and 
unbundle their networks.  This could be achieved by setting the rates of unbundling at the cost of 
interconnection and provisioning the element, plus the full opportunity cost to the ILEC of providing the 
element.  This pricing scheme is known as the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR), and was 
proposed by a number of economists in order to induce efficient levels of investment by entrants (Laffont 
& Tirole 2000; Baumol & Sidak 1994).  It provides an incentive to the ILEC to provision UNEs to 
competitors when they are more efficient in provisioning complementary elements.  The FCC rejected 
this rule, however, partly on efficiency grounds, because "the ECPR does not provide any mechanism for 
moving prices towards competitive levels; it simply takes prices as given" and "application of ECPR 
would result in input prices that would be either higher or lower than those which would be generated in a 
competitive market and would not lead to efficient retail pricing" (FCC 1996a, 15859-60).22   
 Deregulatory Contracting Approach.  Congress could have chosen a deregulatory approach to the 
local exchange market.  Unbundled access to network elements, interconnection, and resale could all be 
available only as a matter of private contracts between the ILECs and new entrants.  Although the 
simplicity of this approach and the corresponding decrease in regulatory costs has some appeal, ILECs 
lack the incentive to enter into contracts at prices that would permit competitors to compete.  New 
Zealand adopted this scheme in 1987, and competition has failed to develop there (Economides 1999). 
3. Section 271: A Prize for Compliance 
In the scheme adopted by Congress, requirements for interconnection and unbundling for ILECs 
are set out in section 251, and a large "prize" is given to the BOCs for demonstrating compliance in 
section 271.23  The prize, of course, is allowing BOC entry into the long distance market, a market the 
BOCs were prohibited from entering under the MFJ.  The BOCs are likely to enjoy significant profits 
from entry into the long distance market, due to the scope economies involved in provisioning both local 
and long distance services, resulting in substantial savings in administrative, marketing and overhead 
costs in serving long distance customers relative to the IXCs, and the low network costs involved, 
estimated at about one cent per minute (Schwartz 2000; Crandall & Waverman 1995; MacAvoy 1998).24  
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 The use of a prize as a tool for ensuring compliance has several advantages over other incentive 
mechanisms available, especially penalties based on observed infractions and deadlines.  First, it reduces 
the need for the regulator to monitor the pace of changes, or determine appropriate deadlines.  Assuming 
clear and observable outcomes can be determined in advance, the BOC will have an incentive to meet 
those objectives, and therefore the need for the regulator to monitor progress, and determine if any delays 
are unwarranted, is greatly reduced. 
 Second, the regulator has an advantage legally in terms of the burden of proof.  When awarding a 
prize, the burden of proof rests on the applicant to show that it has complied with the conditions of the 
prize.  The imposition of fines or other enforcement penalties, on the other hand, requires the regulator to 
demonstrate that the penalty is warranted.  While equal-sized penalties and rewards should have a 
symmetric impact on a firm's incentive to comply, the legal system’s asymmetric treatment of penalties 
and rewards makes the use of rewards less cumbersome and potentially more effective.  This is 
particularly the case with complicated and technically complex regulations, when the regulators’ inherent 
incomplete information about the regulated firm makes it difficult to prove a violation has occurred.  Use 
of a reward gives the company an incentive to provide information to the regulator in order to 
demonstrate it has complied.  It also gives the regulator the flexibility to determine what proof the 
company needs to provide. 
 Third, utilizing a prize can be superior to threatening penalties if the legislator/regulator is fairly 
certain about the benefits of the new regulations, but is uncertain as to their cost, and therefore is unsure 
whether to mandate the change.  If the total social cost from the change is equal to the company’s private 
cost of implementing it, then by setting the prize equal to the total benefit to society from the new 
regulations, the company will have an incentive to implement the necessary changes only if the social 
benefit exceeds the social cost of making the change.  In the case of section 271, however, the benefit of 
increased local competition from unbundling and interconnection is very likely to differ from the "prize" 
offered of entry into long distance, thus possibly leading to a sub-optimal outcome.  The use of a direct 
monetary prize might have been more efficient, but is politically difficult to offer.25  
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 Section 271 provides the prize of long distance entry if the BOCs demonstrate to the FCC that 
they have taken the necessary steps to open up their networks to interconnection with CLECs, and have 
implemented the processes necessary to provision UNEs to CLECs in a nondiscriminatory manner.  
Because it is difficult to observe a BOC’s internal processes, the FCC has used the limited amount of 
freedom the Act gives it in choosing how to evaluate an application to urge that section 271 applicants 
submit evidence that make compliance more easily observable.26  For instance, applicants rely on the 
submission of performance metric data, measuring the BOC's performance in providing service to 
CLECs, to demonstrate that they are provisioning services to the CLECs in a timely and non-
discriminatory manner.27  The FCC has also encouraged the use of independent third party tests to 
demonstrate that the BOC's OSS are readily accessible to the CLECs, for those areas of the BOC's 
operation difficult to measure with performance metrics (e.g., the quality of help documentation), and for 
areas where commercial volumes are too low to evaluate using performance metrics.  Once 271 approval 
is granted the carrot for ensuring compliance is gone, but monitoring of post-approval compliance is made 
easier with the requirement that the BOCs continue to submit performance metric reports to the FCC.28  
The danger of post-approval backsliding has also been much reduced by the establishment of performance 
assurance plans that generate automatic payments by the BOC for poor performance to CLECs when 
indicated by the performance metrics.29 
 In addition, the section 271 process depends heavily on actions by state PUCs.  Under sections 
251 and 252 the state PUCs arbitrate interconnection agreements, and can also help develop a statement 
of generally available terms in order to expedite interconnection negotiations.  The FCC has encouraged 
state PUCs to play an active role in the 271 process, by providing an independent evaluation of BOC 
compliance with the checklist, developing a third-party test of the BOC's OSS, creating performance 
metrics to measure BOC performance and provide for an independent audit of the BOC's data, and 
developing a performance assurance plan to prevent post-approval backsliding.30  The BOCs have 
cooperated with state PUC efforts partly because the FCC’s section 271 precedent relies heavily on the 
development of this kind of evidence, but also because state PUC endorsement of their section 271 
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application is helpful in seeking approval at the FCC.  This has given the state PUCs some leverage to 
develop their own rules, and to develop a performance assurance plan.31  Thus, the Act allows the state 
PUCs some room for experimentation, within the confines of the Act and FCC regulations.  To a large 
extent, the success or failure of the Act to bring local competition to each state depends on the actions of 
the state PUC to arbitrate interconnection agreements, set wholesale prices, monitor BOC performance to 
CLECs, fix any deficiencies that appear in the performance metrics and the performance assurance plan, 
and handle complaints and take enforcement action if problems with BOC performance appear. 
B. Impact on the long distance market:  Should BOC entry into long distance be linked to 
the BOC's implementation of Section 251? 
While the use of a prize may be a superior solution to the problem of how to efficiently ensure 
BOC compliance with new interconnection and unbundling obligations, letting entry into long distance be 
the prize could prove costly if harm is done to the long distance market.  Harm can occur from an 
unnecessary delay of entry into long distance, by eliminating an entrant capable of providing additional 
competition to the long distance marketplace, or from premature entry, allowing a BOC to vertically 
leverage its market power from the local to the long distance market.  Some economists have argued that 
the long distance market is dominated by an oligopoly which has maintained prices above long-run 
incremental cost through tacit collusion, and suggest that delaying BOC entry to achieve some unrelated 
goal of opening up the local market denies consumers the benefit from adding a potentially powerful 
competitor to the long distance market (MacAvoy 1998; Crandall & Hazlett 2000). 
There is, however, a long-standing concern on the part of regulators about the ability of a firm to 
vertically leverage its market power from one market to another through a vertical price squeeze or some 
other means.  In the development of the MFJ, and in various proceedings of the FCC including the 
Competitive Carrier Proceedings, the ability of ILECs to vertically leverage their market power from the 
local market into other markets has been taken very seriously (FCC 1997).  With a regulated monopoly in 
the local exchange market, BOCs will have an incentive to discriminate against rivals in the long distance 
market once they are granted entry in order to raise prices and reap the benefits of their market power 
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(Schwartz 2000; Economides 1999).32  BOC entry into long distance without adequate safeguards could 
cause harm to the long distance market and lower consumer welfare, if the BOCs are able to vertically 
leverage their market power into the long distance market. 
BOC discrimination against rivals can happen in a variety of ways, including by footdragging in 
initiation of service or providing new features, by offering price structures that appear to be 
nondiscriminatory but in fact favor the BOC’s affiliate, or by degrading the quality of a rival's service.33  
These forms of discrimination might be indistinguishable from legitimate conduct and difficult for 
regulators to detect or correct.  Cooperation between interexchange carriers and their local exchange 
access supplier becomes more important over time as new technologies and the development of new call 
forward and distributing services make interconnection more complex and more difficult to arrange. 
We won't get into a lengthy discussion in this paper of the long distance market and whether 
market prices reflect vigorous competition or collusive oligopoly.  However, we believe that the potential 
for vertical leveraging of market power in the local exchange market into long distance is real, and that 
this threat outweighs any possible benefits from adding one more competitor to the long distance market.  
Therefore the preferred policy is to add a powerful entrant to that market, but only after ensuring that it is 
unable to vertically leverage its market power into the long distance market.  This is best achieved by 
requiring the BOCs to open up their local market to competition before allowing them into the long 
distance market.  If the BOC attempts to degrade the quality of interconnection with competitive IXCs, 
the IXCs’ customers will have the opportunity to switch their local service to another local exchange 
provider that provides good quality interconnection services.  Attempts to discriminate against 
competitive IXCs will then likely accelerate the BOC's loss of market share in the local market.  Thus 
section 271 not only serves as an effective prize for opening up the local market, but also acts as a long-
term guarantee that the BOC will lack the incentive to discriminate against its long distance rivals. 
Section 271 just conditions BOC entry on the local market being open to competition, not on 
there being ubiquitous and pervasive competitive entry (such as would be required with a market share 
test).  This can be justified by observing that it is the ability of consumers to switch local exchange 
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companies that limits the BOCs’ incentives to discriminate in the long distance market (Schwartz 2000).  
In addition, in many BOC markets CLEC entry may be slow to occur for a variety of reasons, such as a 
high cost of entry, low retail prices, and the level of demand in those markets.  However, requiring the 
FCC and the state PUCs to certify that the market is open to competition places a heavy regulatory burden 
on these agencies.  They must conduct detailed analyses to determine that the checklist has been met, and 
thereby demonstrate that there are no barriers to entry attributable to BOC failure to make the necessary 
changes to its systems and offerings or to state regulations.  A market share test would have been much 
easier to apply, but would have delayed BOC entry for many markets that are less desirable to CLECs.34 
IV. Statistics on the Development of Local Competition 
 While local competition has grown more slowly than many policymakers desired, there has been 
a steady increase in CLEC market share.  According to data submitted in Form 477 to the FCC, and 
provided in the FCC’s report “Local Telephone Competition: Status as of December 31, 2000,” CLECs 
had 16.4 million lines for a market share of 8.5% of all switched end-user lines in the United States as of 
December 31, 2000.  This was 97% higher than one year earlier.  Data for total CLEC lines is unavailable 
for the period before December 1999, but data provided by the largest ILECs for lines provided to CLECs 
shows that the lines they have sold to CLECs, as resale and UNEs, have climbed rapidly, with an annual 
average growth rate of 62% for December 1997 to December 2000, as seen in Figure 1 (FCC 2001a).35  
Growth appears to have slowed recently, with the estimated number of loops provided by ILECs to 
CLECs for plain old telephone service (POTS) growing by 13% during the period from December 2000 
to June 2001, for an annual growth rate of 28%.36  This may be due to the well-documented woes of the 
CLEC industry, with many CLECs cutting back operations or filing for bankruptcy (Crandall 2001). 
The level of competition across the country varies significantly, with CLECs gaining a market 
share as high as 20% in New York and 12% in Texas.  The breakdown of CLEC market shares by state is 
provided in Figure 2, for those states with publicly available data (FCC 2001a).37  States for which the 
FCC has approved a BOC's 271 application are shaded.38  
 While we have only limited publicly available information about the total number and location of 
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CLEC lines in each state, we have better publicly available information about the number of lines 
purchased for POTS service from the BOCs and their affiliates, obtained from the performance metric 
reports that the BOCs file with state PUCs and with the FCC, for various purposes.39  Using this data, we 
provide in Table 2 the breakdown by state of CLEC purchases of BOC services for providing POTS lines 
according to the type of facilities purchased, whether resale, UNE-P, or UNE-L for June 2001.40  Figure 3 
shows the breakdown by state for June 2001.  While this table and figure does not include full facilities-
based competition, and thus cannot be used to determine CLEC penetration, it does provide an indication 
of the extent of competition in each state. 
The volume of lines provisioned to CLECs by ILECs can be considered a measure of how 
effectively ILECs have opened their systems and have set wholesale prices that allow for entry.  It is 
generally more difficult for ILECs to meet their unbundling and resale obligations (because they may 
require major system changes) than it is for them to meet the needs of full facilities-based CLECs, which 
may only require basic interconnection similar to that already provided to IXCs.  Consequently, this 
paper's data on lines purchased by CLECs may actually provide a better indication of how far the BOCs 
have progressed in meeting their Section 251 obligations than CLEC market share data.  The percentage 
of lines provisioned to CLECs for resale, UNE-P and UNE-L for the larger ILECs for which data is 
publicly available is provided in Table 3, and shown in Figure 4 for December 2000.  The much larger 
proportion of BOC lines ordered by CLECs in states with 271 approval (13.1% of BOC lines), or even in 
states that are eligible for 271 approval (4.2%), than for ILECs for whom section 271 does not apply 
(2.0% of ILEC lines), supports the argument that section 271 has been successful in providing an 
incentive for BOCs to open up their networks and allow for greater entry.41 
The drawback to using this data is that the FCC’s review of Section 271 applications, under the 
standard set by Congress, is not based on the extent of CLECs' penetration in the market, but instead 
whether the BOC has met the section 271 requirements, which effectively mean the market is open to 
competition. Thus, sections 251 and 271 do not guarantee that all forms of entry will be possible by 
efficient entrants, only that the cost of accessing the BOC's OSS systems, wholesale prices, the ability to 
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get an interconnection agreement, and state and federal regulations will not be a hindrance to entry.  Other 
factors have a major impact on the level of competitive entry in a state, including the level of retail prices, 
the quality and diversity of the ILEC's retail products, demand characteristics such as the wealth and 
density of customers and the number of businesses buying telecom services, the aggressiveness of the 
state commission in promoting competition, and the level of CLEC entrepreneurial activity in a state.  For 
example, lower levels of CLEC entry into non-BOC ILECs' territories could be because smaller ILECs 
are usually located in rural areas, which may be less attractive markets to entrants. 
From Figures 3 and 4 it is clear that in states with section 271 authority or with significant levels 
of CLEC purchases of lines, CLECs have tended to rely heavily on UNE-P as an entry strategy, especially 
in New York and Texas.  In June 2001 UNE-P loops have been 65% of the lines purchased from BOCs in 
states with 271 approval versus 22% without it.  When UNE-P prices provide a substantial discount from 
retail prices, which resale does not, UNE-P becomes an attractive means of reaching customers, 
especially price-sensitive residential customers who will only switch to achieve a significant savings.42  
Meanwhile, resale is a fairly popular entry strategy in most states.43  In addition, while much has been 
made of CLECs' "cream-skimming" business customers while avoiding serving residential customers, 
data available suggests that CLECs are going after residential customers.  Forty-one percent of CLEC 
lines in December 2000 were reported to be provided to residential and small business customers (FCC 
2001a).  In New York the state PUC reported that 52% of CLEC lines went to residential customers (New 
York Public Service Commission 2001). 
 We lack comparable consistent statistics measuring the growth of BOC entry on the long distance 
market, due to the recency of the BOCs' 271 approvals.  However, Verizon reported in August 2001 it had 
signed up 6 million long distance customers, and had a market share of 31% in New York and 16% in 
Massachusetts (Verizon Press Release).  SBC reported in July 2001 that it had gained 2.8 million 
customers in Texas, Kansas, and Oklahoma (SBC Press Release).44  
V. Conclusion 
 Section 271 has generated more controversy in the press and in political debate than it has in the 
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economics literature.  We hope that will change, because it represents a bold attempt to provide a strong 
incentive for ILECs to open up their networks, and cooperate with regulators, while providing protection 
for the long distance market.  Sections 251 and 271 are part of an experiment to see if competition and 
rapid innovation can be brought to a market that has been considered a natural monopoly, and that 
historically has been slow to change in technology and products.  There is much to learn from the 
successes and failures of this experiment, and future and foreign regulators could benefit from the insights 
gained by economists here. 
 The slow development of local competition has concerned many policymakers, but as section IV 
pointed out, there has been significant and continuous growth already.  The process of opening up such a 
technologically complex industry with closed systems should have been expected to take many years.  
There were unrealistic expectations by many of the players (including CLECs, regulators, legislators, and 
investors) about how fast competition would develop.  This process has been delayed further by litigation, 
conflicting court rulings, and disputes over who has the proper jurisdiction over each part of the process. 
A key part of the process is having all parties accept a common set of ground rules, and even now, this 
could be derailed by political pressures, new court challenges, regulatory fatigue, and the volatility of 
financial markets and the economy. 
Based on our analysis of the industry’s technical and economic structure, and the constraints 
under which regulators operate, we believe that section 271 is a more effective incentive structure for 
opening the local market to competition than other typically-used regulatory alternatives.  We also believe 
that it is an appropriate safeguard for protecting competition in the long distance market after BOC entry 
has occurred.  While full assessment will only be possible after twenty or thirty years, the statistical 
evidence we have five years after enactment of the Act suggests that the section 271 incentive mechanism 
has accelerated the process of opening local exchange markets to competition. 
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Endnotes
 
1 Daniel R. Shiman is an Economist and Jessica Rosenworcel an Attorney-Advisor in the Policy and Program 
Planning Division of the Common Carrier Bureau at the Federal Communications Commission. Opinions expressed 
are those of the authors alone, and do not represent the views or policies of the FCC or its commissioners. 
2 We do not address the appropriate level of prices associated with competitive entry in the local exchange market. 
3 Thus, the court generally concluded that the efficiency losses that would likely result from the BOCs’ ability to 
engage in anti-competitive conduct outweighed the benefit of the BOCs’ presence in the long distance market.  See 
generally BellSouth v. FCC, 162 F.3d 678, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
4 The Act provided that “[a]ny conduct or activity that was, before the date of enactment [of the Act], subject to any 
restriction or obligation imposed by the [MFJ] shall, on and after such date, be subject to the restrictions and 
obligations imposed by the [Act] and shall not be subject to the restrictions and the obligations imposed by [the 
MFJ]” (Pub. L. No. 104-04, sect. 601(a)(1), 110 Stat. 56, 143). 
5 The other UNEs the FCC required to be unbundled are the Network Interface Device or NID, signalling and call-
related databases, Operations Support Systems, and the high frequency portion of the loop (47 C.F.R. sect. 319). 
6 See 47 U.S.C. sect. 252(d); 47 C.F.R. sect. 51.501 et seq.; Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 15499, 15844-47 (1996).  Although the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stayed the FCC’s pricing rules in 1996, the Supreme Court 
restored the FCC’s pricing authority on January 25, 1999, and remanded to the Eighth Circuit for consideration of 
the merits of the challenged rules.  Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 109 F.3d 418 (8th Cir. 1996), 120 F.3d 753, 800, 804-06 
(8th Cir. 1997), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom., AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999).  On 
remand from the Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit concluded that certain FCC pricing rules are contrary to 
congressional intent.  Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 219 F.3d 744 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom. Verizon 
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 121 S.Ct. 877 (2001).  The Eighth Circuit has stayed the issuance of its mandate 
pending review by the Supreme Court.  Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, No. 96-3321 et al. (8th Cir., Sept. 25, 2000). 
7 Many CLECs serving medium-sized business customers will purchase a high capacity (DS1 or higher) loop and 
transport to that customer and will aggregate the voice and data traffic onto that circuit. 
8 Resale is often used to serve business customers, especially those will to pay extra for better customer service or in 
locations that the CLEC’s network does not yet reach, and residential customers who have failed to pay their bills to 
the ILEC.  
9 Thus, through the Track B test, a BOC operating in a state where there are no CLECs pursuing entry may 
nonetheless be eligible to apply for section 271 authority.   
10 It is possible that because of the ILEC’s scale economies and low retail prices, and the presence of other barriers 
and difficulties hindering CLEC entry, that effective local competition could never develop.  This paper assumes 
that effective local competition can be achieved through the right set of incentive and regulatory mechanisms. 
11 Because of these scale economies the local exchange market has been considered to be a natural monopoly, and 
regulated as such.  
12 Arguably, full-facilities based competition would yield the most benefits to consumers, not because it will lower 
prices the most, but because the potential long-term gains from innovation are greatest, including working around 
the bottleneck.  However, CLECs may not find it economically feasible to use their own facilities to serve many 
kinds of customers. 
13 For example, technological changes may change the location of bottlenecks, may change the cost of unbundling 
particular elements, and may change the speed with which requirements may be implemented.   
14 Some parts of the network are difficult to unbundle for CLECs’ use, such as digital loop carrier systems, which 
may have been employed in place of the traditional copper loop. 
15 This is only a partial list of the actions an ILEC must take to open its network to competitors' use.  For a more 
detailed discussion, see FCC 1996a and the FCC's various orders in response to section 271 applications. 
16 The ambitious nature of the Act makes it highly regulatory in certain aspects, requiring detailed regulations 
governing the ILECs wholesaling of their networks and services, but with the goal of reducing regulation at the 
retail level.  A similar purpose was served by Part 68 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which provides detailed 
rules governing the connection of customers premise equipment (CPE) to the network, in order to improve 
competition in the CPE market. 
17 Usually regulators are setting retail prices which the firm has an incentive to produce, with the price set above 
marginal cost.  The Act appears to create a very unusual situation historically, in which firms are required to go to a 
great deal of effort to produce a good they do not want to sell. 
18 As has been widely recognized, there are circumstances in which upstream monopolists who are competing 
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downstream will not want to discriminate against users of their inputs, such as when they can extract their monopoly 
profits upstream, or when the downstream users are much more efficient, but those circumstances do not generally 
apply to ILECs (Laffont & Tirole 1999; Schwartz 2000).  In addition, ILECs gain two benefits from degrading 
competitors’ access, one from reducing their loss of retail customers, and the second from saving money by not 
developing the needed facilities for unbundling and interconnection.  
19 For a discussion of problems of this sort, see Morris and Preece 1982. 
20 It is very difficult to set performance standards and benchmarks concerning the negotiation of new arrangements 
and the working out of technical details.  The Act provides for the use of arbitration and regulatory rule-making to 
resolve outstanding issues, but this process can be slow. 
21 New York and Illinois were early states to promote competition in the local exchange market (Tomlinson 2000, 
169).  
22 ECPR was also rejected because it was inconsistent with the Act, since "the existing retail prices that would be 
used to compute incremental opportunity costs under ECPR are not cost-based" (FCC 1996a, 15859). 
23 The remainder of this section concentrates on the BOCs, since section 271 only pertains to them.  They were the 
only ILECs prohibited from entering the long distance market under the MFJ, so Congress had the unique 
opportunity to use long distance entry as a prize for them.  The BOCs are by far the largest ILECs, and have about 
75% of the nation’s access lines.  
24 Indeed, in states where it has been permitted to sell long distance service, SWBT only offers long distance service 
to customers that are also taking its local service. 
25 Tax credits, however, are sometimes used as a prize for undertaking some action such as an investment. 
26 The Act requires that the FCC process a lot of information about the BOCs’ systems, since the requirement is only 
that the BOCs systems be open to competitors, and not that the market is competitive. 
27 “Non-discriminatory service” is interpreted to mean that service to CLEC customers is of the same quality and 
timeliness as service to the BOC’s retail customers, when the same service is provided to both sets of customers. 
28 Under section 271(d)(6) the FCC has authority to take an enforcement action if the BOC’s performance were to 
decline post-approval. 
29 This comports with Marius Schwartz’s argument that the section 271 prize is needed so long as new arrangements 
are being made.  Once the arrangements are established and reporting mechanisms in place, routine enforcement 
should be sufficient to prevent discrimination against CLECs (Schwartz 2000). 
30 The FCC has encouraged the use of open collaboratives, in which CLECs can participate and voice their concerns, 
in the state process.  Where state PUCs lack the requisite resources to accomplish all of these tasks, they often rely 
on the efforts of large state PUCs in their BOC region to accomplish the more difficult region-wide tasks, such as 
conduct a third party test, or in some cases have pooled their resources with other state PUCs in the region.  
31 Many state PUCs lack the statutory authority to impose a plan that provides for automatic fines levied against the 
BOC, so with the FCC's encouragement, the BOCs have voluntarily submitted to a state-developed performance 
assurance plan. 
32 According to economic theory, a firm with an unregulated monopoly in one market will be unlikely to 
discriminate against rivals in a vertically-related market, since the firm should be able to extract all possible 
monopoly profits by raising prices in the monopolized market.  However, there is an incentive to vertically leverage 
the market power if the monopolized market is regulated, such that the firm is unable to raise prices and extract 
monopoly profits from it. 
33 Degradation of a rival's service can occur by allowing interconnection to deteriorate, thus allowing more calls to 
be blocked to an IXC than calls to its own long distance affiliate.  One BOC engineer has said that in the past it set 
up its tandems to have lower blocking (i.e., fewer calls unable to get through at peak calling times) for long distance 
calls than for local calls, since carrying long distance calls was much more profitable. 
34 A market share test would also have given CLECs owned by the IXCs the opportunity to game the process, by 
limiting their own entry into the local market to prevent BOC entry into long distance.  The IXCs have been seen as 
natural entrants into the local market, and have aggressively entered many local exchange markets through a variety 
of entry strategies. 
35 We use the terms “purchased” and “sold” for convenience, although the lines are in fact being leased, if obtained 
as a UNE, or the services on that line are being resold by the CLEC. 
36 This estimate was based on numbers taken from the performance metric reports, discussed below.  The number of 
UNE loops provisioned for DSL grew at about the same rate for this period.  
37 The data was withheld for about a third of the states for confidentiality reasons (FCC 2001a). 
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38 The states counted as having section 271 approval for this section are those states currently having approval: New 
York, Texas, Kansas, Oklahoma, Massachusetts, Connecticut and Pennsylvania.  Note that this graph includes all 
ILEC lines in the state, while 271 approval applies only to the BOC territory in these states.  The data used comes 
from FCC 2001a, and is the number of switched access lines reported by each CLEC divided by the total number of 
switched access lines (CLEC plus ILEC) in the state.  FCC approval is not based on market share lost to CLECs, 
which explains why some states with lower levels of CLEC entry have received section 271 approval. 
39 These reports show the level of performance by the BOC to the CLECs in a variety of areas and product lines, and 
compare it to performance to their own customers, where possible, or to a benchmark.  The reports were developed 
for section 271 applications, and to meet the conditions of a merger approval.  See http://www.fcc.gov/ccb/mcot/ for 
performance metric data filed for the SBC-Ameritech and Bell Atlantic-GTE mergers.  The total number of CLEC 
lines for a particular product category for a state were taken from the December 2000 and June 2001 reported CLEC 
volumes (i.e., the denominator used) for the network trouble report rate metrics, which measure the percentage of all 
lines in a product category that had a reported trouble for that month.  We consider this data to be more reliable than 
the form 477 data, since for both section 271 applications and for the merger conditions an audit of the data was 
required. 
40 We assumed that the number of ILEC lines remained the same as for December 2000 (according to FCC ARMIS 
data, growth of BOC access lines appears to have been about zero for 1999-2000).  By the term “BOC” we are 
referring to states classified as in-region territories for section 271 purposes.  Companies subsequently merged into 
the BOCs, such as SNET (now a part of SBC) and GTE (now a part of Verizon), are considered separately for the 
purposes of this discussion.  Section 271’s requirements do not apply for BOC affiliates in states the BOCs were not 
in when the Act was passed. 
41 The data for "BOCs in states with section 271 authority" are for the BOCs in all states that today have 271 
authorization, for both December 2000 and June 2001.  See fn. 38 for the list of those states. 
42 The long-term economic benefits from CLECs offering UNE-P and resale, however, are likely to be much less 
than those from CLECs investing in their own facilities, for full or partial facilities-based competition. 
43 Statistics available indicate that resale is used to serve business customers more – about 55% of resale POTS lines 
went to business customers in June 2001, from data for all of the BOCs except Verizon.  In New York 90% of all 
resale lines went to business customers.  Resale can be an easy and useful means of providing service to small and 
medium-sized businesses who are willing to pay extra for customized billing and additional customer care. 
44 This translates into about 43% of Verizon’s own estimated 14 million retail lines in New York and Massachusetts 
and 27% of SBC’s own 10.2 million retail customers in Texas, Kansas, and Oklahoma, excluding CLEC lines. 
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Table 2: Percentage of BOC Switched Lines Purchased by CLECs, by Type of Line, for 
June 2001 
Lines Purchased by CLECs 
State BOC 
Total 
BOC 
Lines 
BOC % 
of ILEC 
Lines 
Percent 
Resale
Percent 
UNE-P
Percent 
UNE-L 
Percent 
Total Total Lines
Alabama BellSouth 1,997,723 79% 2.2% 1.8% 0.6% 4.7% 93,048
Arizona Qwest 2,959,467 93% 1.7% 0.3% 0.5% 2.5% 73,272
Arkansas SBC- SWBT 1,048,587 69% 3.3% 0.5% 1.6% 5.4% 56,340
California SBC- PacTel 18,810,937 78% 1.0% 0.3% 1.6% 2.9% 552,391
Colorado Qwest 2,845,889 96% 2.0% 1.7% 0.8% 4.6% 130,480
Connecticut Verizon- BA North 57,893 99% 3.5% 0.0% 0.9% 4.4% 2,547
Delaware Verizon- BA South 595,708 100% 1.8% 0.0% 2.9% 4.7% 28,061
District of Verizon- BA South 1,019,026 100% 7.8% 0.0% 0.9% 8.7% 89,023
Florida BellSouth 6,850,656 59% 3.0% 1.4% 1.6% 6.0% 408,159
Georgia BellSouth 4,264,151 83% 2.7% 3.1% 1.5% 7.4% 313,869
Idaho Qwest 583,168 72% 1.8% 0.1% 0.0% 1.9% 11,013
Illinois SBC- Ameritech 6,880,696 85% 3.9% 1.9% 3.0% 8.8% 607,957
Indiana SBC- Ameritech 2,256,736 62% 1.5% 0.0% 1.6% 3.2% 71,381
Iowa Qwest 1,143,962 65% 1.0% 11.0% 0.8% 12.8% 146,145
Kansas SBC- SWBT 1,389,742 84% 5.7% 3.9% 0.3% 9.9% 137,041
Kentucky BellSouth 1,264,064 57% 2.4% 1.4% 0.3% 4.0% 50,859
Louisiana BellSouth 2,439,723 93% 3.8% 0.6% 0.4% 4.8% 115,929
Maine Verizon- BA North 749,853 83% 5.3% 0.2% 1.2% 6.8% 50,868
Maryland Verizon- BA South 4,051,759 100% 5.5% 0.1% 1.0% 6.6% 267,007
Massachusetts Verizon- BA North 4,636,622 100% 5.8% 0.6% 1.8% 8.2% 378,294
Michigan SBC- Ameritech 5,397,189 84% 2.0% 3.2% 2.3% 7.5% 403,613
Minnesota Qwest 2,342,669 73% 3.1% 3.4% 2.1% 8.7% 203,010
Mississippi BellSouth 1,359,773 93% 4.4% 1.0% 0.3% 5.7% 77,687
Missouri SBC- SWBT 2,605,726 75% 4.1% 2.3% 0.3% 6.7% 173,384
Montana Qwest 386,624 68% 3.2% 0.1% 0.4% 3.6% 14,067
Nebraska Qwest 507,263 50% 2.2% 0.4% 1.3% 3.9% 20,035
Nevada SBC- PacTel 380,616 27% 2.1% 0.0% 1.6% 3.8% 14,285
New Hampshire Verizon- BA North 816,322 94% 5.5% 0.3% 2.9% 8.8% 71,801
New Jersey Verizon- BA South 6,914,330 97% 2.9% 0.1% 0.5% 3.5% 240,290
New Mexico Qwest 863,377 85% 1.1% 0.0% 0.4% 1.5% 13,250
New York Verizon- BA North 12,050,789 89% 3.0% 14.5% 2.2% 19.6% 2,365,206
North Carolina BellSouth 2,603,650 50% 2.3% 1.2% 1.4% 4.9% 128,832
North Dakota Qwest 218,651 61% 4.8% 11.1% 1.5% 17.4% 38,038
Ohio SBC- Ameritech 4,063,464 59% 1.3% 0.7% 2.4% 4.5% 181,924
Oklahoma SBC- SWBT 1,660,815 83% 3.2% 1.5% 0.3% 4.9% 81,690
Oregon Qwest 1,460,169 66% 1.7% 2.6% 2.2% 6.5% 94,355
Pennsylvania Verizon- BA South 6,366,128 77% 2.0% 3.7% 2.4% 8.1% 516,057
Rhode Island Verizon- BA North 670,464 100% 4.8% 0.3% 3.4% 8.5% 57,113
South Carolina BellSouth 1,543,218 65% 3.3% 1.2% 0.7% 5.1% 79,358
South Dakota Qwest 280,799 65% 3.9% 6.2% 0.4% 10.6% 29,676
Tennessee BellSouth 2,764,068 80% 1.8% 1.2% 1.6% 4.6% 125,973
Texas SBC- SWBT 8,947,790 77% 3.3% 13.3% 1.1% 17.7% 1,586,888
Utah Qwest 1,165,099 95% 1.9% 0.2% 0.8% 2.8% 33,070
Vermont Verizon- BA North 368,392 85% 4.9% 0.1% 0.1% 5.1% 18,898
Virginia Verizon- BA South 3,800,149 76% 3.3% 0.0% 3.1% 6.5% 245,516
Washington Qwest 2,607,757 67% 1.4% 1.2% 1.1% 3.8% 98,557
West Virginia Verizon- BA South 897,968 84% 1.4% 0.0% 1.0% 2.4% 21,407
Wisconsin SBC- Ameritech 2,160,922 63% 5.4% 0.0% 5.0% 10.4% 223,866
Wyoming Qwest 261,266 83% 1.0% 8.2% 0.0% 9.1% 23,900
Nationwide BOC 141,311,809 75% 3.1% 3.0% 1.6% 7.6% 10,765,430
Source: FCC's ARMIS database, BOC Performance Metric Reports
Note: For some states CLEC purchased lines data is for June 1, not June 30. 
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Table 3: Percentage of ILEC Lines Purchased by CLECs, by Type of Line and 
Type of ILEC 
        
CLEC Lines Purchased as Percent of 
ILEC Lines
 Total ILEC 
Switched 
Access Lines 
% of US 
Switched 
Access 
Lines 
Resale UNE-P UNE-L Total 
Total 
CLEC 
Lines 
Purchased
   
December 2000   
Total ILEC 186,501,328 100% 2.7% 1.7% 1.1% 5.5% 10,243,113
In-region BOCs 141,311,809 75.8% 3.0% 2.2% 1.2% 6.4% 9,110,970
   
BOCs in states with 271 35,109,779 18.8% 4.1% 7.7% 1.3% 13.1% 4,598,121
BOCs in states w/o 271 106,202,030 56.9% 2.6% 0.4% 1.2% 4.2% 4,512,849
NonBOCs 44,970,534 24.1% 1.5% 0.0% 0.5% 2.0% 913,158
   
BellSouth 25,087,026 13.5% 3.0% 0.9% 1.1% 5.0% 1,264,846
Qwest 17,626,160 9.5% 1.3% 2.0% 0.7% 3.9% 696,126
SBC- SWBT 15,652,660 8.4% 4.2% 6.3% 0.7% 11.1% 1,743,935
SBC- Ameritech 20,759,007 11.1% 3.2% 0.1% 2.1% 5.4% 1,126,259
SBC- PacTell 19,191,553 10.3% 1.2% 0.0% 1.3% 2.5% 483,610
Verizon- BA North 19,350,335 10.4% 5.1% 8.4% 1.6% 15.1% 2,912,404
Verizon- BA South 23,645,068 12.7% 1.4% 1.2% 1.1% 3.7% 883,790
   
Verizon- GTE 20,020,554 10.7% 1.4% 0.0% 0.4% 1.9% 377,387
SBC- SNET 2,449,914 1.3% 2.9% 0.0% 0.2% 3.1% 75,708
   
June 2001   
Total ILEC 186,501,328 100% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
In-region BOCs 141,311,809 75.8% 3.0% 3.0% 1.6% 7.6% 10,695,965
   
BOCs in states with 271 35,109,779 18.8% 3.4% 9.3% 1.7% 14.4% 5,067,723
BOCs in states w/o 271 106,202,030 56.9% 2.9% 0.8% 1.6% 5.3% 5,628,242
NonBOCs 44,970,534 24.1% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
   
BellSouth 25,087,026 13.5% 2.8% 1.6% 1.2% 5.6% 1,393,714
Qwest 17,626,160 9.5% 2.0% 2.3% 1.0% 5.3% 928,868
SBC- SWBT 15,652,660 8.4% 3.7% 8.5% 0.8% 13.0% 2,035,343
SBC- Ameritech 20,759,007 11.1% 2.8% 1.6% 2.8% 7.2% 1,488,741
SBC- PacTell 19,191,553 10.3% 1.0% 0.3% 1.6% 3.0% 566,676
Verizon- BA North 19,350,335 10.4% 4.0% 9.2% 2.1% 15.2% 2,944,727
Verizon- BA South 23,645,068 12.7% 3.3% 1.0% 1.6% 6.0% 1,407,361
   
Verizon- GTE 20,020,554 10.7% 1.2% 0.0% 0.5% 1.7% 348,539
SBC- SNET 2,449,914 1.3% 3.1% 0.0% 0.6% 3.8% 92,477
Source: ARMIS, BOC Performance Metric Reports, FCC 2001a 
Note: For some states CLEC purchased lines data is for the beginning of the month. 
Total BOC lines assumed to be the same for December and June. 
N/A = Not Available 
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